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Economic analysis of natural resource and environmental issues inappropriately
places too much emphasis on Pigouvian externalities and too little on Coasean
property rights and transaction costs. The crucial questions are who has what
property rights and what are the transaction costs associated with these property
rights. Asserting an externality implicitly assumes a set of property rights and
hence a distribution of the social costs, but it is precisely a lack of property rights
that allows decision makers to ignore social costs. By viewing natural resource and
environmental problems through a Coasean lens, we better focus our attention on
how property rights evolve, how they inﬂuence transaction costs, and how those




While Nobel laureate Ronald Coase’s (1960) most cited article in the history
of economic science should have opened all economists’ eyes, and especially
those of natural resource economists, to a superior way to analyse social cost,
most economic analysis of the environment has not progressed much beyond
Pigou (1912, 1920). Accordingly, environmental issues and natural resource
misallocation are explained by a divergence between social and private costs.
At the heart of the Pigouvian approach is the deceptively simple but
alarmingly complex term, externality. An externality is said to occur when
parties to market transactions fail to take into account the effects of their
actions on third parties who bear costs (negative externalities) for which
they are not compensated or reap beneﬁts (positive externalities) for which
they do not pay. Accordingly, market transactions lead to inefﬁcient outcomes
 
* Useful comments were provided by Jonathan Adler, P.J. Hill, Alan Randall, Scott
Kieff, and participants at the 48th Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural and
Resource Economics Society and a seminar at the Case Western Reserve University Law
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with too much of a bad or too little of a good produced. The concept seems
so simple and obvious that, at least early on, few even challenged the idea.
Following this analysis, the policy prescription is to regulate the quantity
produced, to tax transactions, to subsidise production, to have the government
take over production, or some combination of all four (see, for instance, the
discussion in Meade (1952) and Bator (1958)).
A few economists have challenged the notion of externalities calling
instead for a Coasean focus on property rights (e.g., see Cheung 1970, 1973;
Dahlman 1979; Randall 1983), but those challenges have generally not been
heeded in textbooks and policy analysis. Where property rights are not
clearly speciﬁed, claims of externalities implicitly assume a structure of
property rights and, therefore, assume away the crux of the resource-
allocation problem.
In the case of negative externalities, the implicit assumption is that the
party who bears costs for which he is not compensated has a right to be
free from those costs, and in the case of positive externalities that the party
who provides the free ride has a right to be compensated for his produc-
tion. We are inclined to say when we see smoke coming from a stack, hear
loud music from a stereo, or see a hillside clearcut of its trees that these are
externalities because people breathing the smoke, hearing the music, or
viewing the bare hillside are bearing the costs of other people’s actions. To
use the term externalities amounts to asserting that the producer who emits
smoke does not have a right to use the air and that the person seeing
through it or breathing it does; that the music lover has no right to produce
loud music and that quiet lovers have a right to be free of the music; and
that the landowner has no right to clearcut his land and that the passerby
has a right to view uncut forests. Each is an assertion of a property rights




By assuming a set of property rights, the externality approach glosses
over the cause of natural resource misallocation in the ﬁrst place; namely
the lack of fully speciﬁed enforceable and transferable property rights.
Donning Coase-coloured glasses, economists long ago should have dropped
the Pigouvian externality paradigm which implicitly assumes a structure of
property rights and put in its place the Coasean property rights-transaction
costs paradigm which focuses on the lack of property rights as the cause of
conﬂict. Doing so would have followed the lead of Alan Randall (1983)
who recognised the imprecision and confusion caused by the term externality
and called for ‘more precise terminology, based on notions of nonexclusive-




  For a discussion of the importance of morals, custom, and law in the context of extern-
alities and environmental problems, see Randall (2000). 
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The purpose of the present paper is to refocus the economic analysis
of environmental and natural resource issues through the Coasean lens of
reciprocal costs, property rights, and transaction costs. Recognising that




I ask how a Coasean perspective changes the way we analyse conﬂicts over
resource use and policy options used to deal with changing demands and
new technologies that create these conﬂicts. After developing the Coasean
lens, I consider the evolution of property rights resulting from changing
resource demands and new technologies as that evolution relates to zoning,
water use, and endangered species. These cases illustrate how ‘Coase-
coloured glasses’ suggest different responses to exogenous changes in resource




 The question becomes, as
Randall (1983, p. 155) puts it: do changing resource demands and new
technologies leave existing rights holders ‘maintaining their previous
positions and trading to preferred positions, or will they be placed in a
“pay or suffer” situation.’ In other words, do property rights evolve from
existing property rights through contracting with those rights holders to
reallocate rights and establish new ones or do they change through
revolutionary processes that cancel existing rights and redistribute them to
new individuals or groups in an effort to meet the new demands and new
technologies? The concluding section suggests that the former is more
likely to promote stable, predictable, and transferable property rights as a
way of preventing the tragedy of the commons, while the latter creates the
potential for replacing the tragedy of the commons with the tragedy of rent
seeking.
 
2. Expunging externalities from our vocabulary
 
In 1960, Coase taught us that the problem of social costs was best charac-





 If one person wants to use air as a disposal medium for waste
and another wants to breathe that same air free of the waste, there are com-
peting uses. If one person wants to use the air to transmit sound waves and




  Note that I speciﬁcally have chosen not to call them problems. Saying that there are
environmental problems is no different than saying there are transportation problems
because it is costly to transport goods from one point to another. Just as transportation








  For an elucidation of Coase’s point, see Yandle (1998). 
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person wants to produce lumber for the market and another wants to view
live trees, there are competing uses.
Coase emphasised that because one use precludes the other, the costs are
reciprocal. In other words, if air is used to transmit sound waves to music
lovers, there is a cost to those who love quiet, and if the air is used to pro-
duce quiet, there is a cost to those who love music. Either way there is an
opportunity cost created by the competing uses.
Suppose there is an apartment building with two apartments. In one
apartment lives a person who enjoys music and values louder and louder
music (more decibels) at a declining marginal rate (see ﬁgure 1). In other
words, additional decibels provide more value to the music lover, but the
marginal value of decibels declines until it reaches zero at the maximum
number of decibels that can be produced by his equipment. In the other
apartment lives a person who values quiet such that fewer decibels of noise
are worth more with the marginal value of quiet declining until it reaches
zero with no noise.
There is an optimal level of noise at the point where the marginal value
of a decibel to the music lover is just equal to the marginal value of a decibel
of quiet to the quiet lover, shown in ﬁgure 1 at point D*. The question is
whether this optimal level of decibels will be achieved. The typical Pigouvian
analysis would assert that there is an externality because marginal private
costs are less than marginal social costs. There is a divergence because the
music lover is imposing a cost on the quiet lover. But this is not how Coase
taught us to think about this conﬂicting use of apartment space.
Consider a case where there are no rules regarding noise in the apartment
building and where the quiet lover moves in ﬁrst. When the music lover moves
Figure 1 Optimal decibel level. 
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in and turns his stereo up to full volume, the quiet lover will clearly have
reduced value of quiet. He is likely to respond by knocking on the door of the
music lover asserting a ﬁrst possession right to be free of noise (see Lueck





sell it, the costs are fully accounted for when the music lover compensates the
quiet lover for the costs he bears or ceases producing music.
If the quiet lover cannot defend his right to quiet, there will be too much
noise because the music lover is not bearing the cost of lost quiet. But, as
we  will discuss below, even this discussion requires considering Coasean
transaction costs associated with deﬁning and enforcing property rights
relative to the value of the rights.
Now reverse the arrival of the dwellers so that the music lover is the ﬁrst
possessor of an apartment. When the quiet lover moves in, he might again
knock on the door of the music lover and assert that a cost has been
imposed on him. But in this case the music lover is likely to assert a right
to play his music as loudly as he likes based on ﬁrst possession. Assuming
he can defend his right, the costs will again be fully accounted for when the
quiet lover compensates the music lover for his reduced decibels or puts up
with the music. If the quiet lover could force the music lover to reduce the
volume without compensation; that is, the music lover cannot defend his
rights, there will be too much quiet because the quiet lover is not bearing
the cost of reduced decibels.
This example illustrates Coase’s important realisation that social costs
are reciprocal. If the quiet lover has the right to be free of noise, the music
lover will bear the cost of scarcity, and if the music lover has the right to
music, the quiet lover will bear the cost of scarcity. How the rights are
assigned will affect who bears the costs and, depending on transaction costs,
may affect resource allocation and certainly will affect wealth distribution.
Even in the absence of property rights, reciprocal costs remain, but without
property rights there is no way to say who is imposing costs on whom and
no way to say there is an externality.
In the absence or presence of property rights, there are reciprocal costs,
but only in the presence of property rights can we say who is imposing
costs on whom. There is noise pollution if the quiet lover has the right to
be free from noise or quiet pollution if the music lover has the right to
music. One might claim that social norms determine the direction of the




  See Randall 2000 (p. 14), where he notes that ‘the term, rights, has currency both in
moral discourse, where it refers to claims that have strong moral foundations, and legal dis-
course, where it refers to claims that are enforceable under the law’. First possession seems
to have an element of both. 
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Saying that this is an externality diverts attention from the important issue
of how property rights are determined and how they allocate reciprocal
costs, which is precisely Coase’s point.
In most cases where the term externality is applied, property rights are not
clear. If they are not, declaring an externality is the equivalent of asserting a
set of rights where they are lacking. Such assertions beg the question of
how rights are formed, whether those rights can be defended, and whether
they can be exchanged in voluntary transactions. These are the transaction
costs that Coase focused on and that are glossed over in Pigouvian analysis.
In the example of the two apartments, there are many factors that might
reduce transaction costs. First, there is the apartment building owner who,
as the residual claimant, has an incentive to maximise the value of the two
apartments by taking into account all costs including the scarcity value of
using the air for sound wave transmission. For example, he might establish
rules regarding noise levels, and these rules would maximise the value of
the joint occupancy. Second, the convention of ﬁrst possession is a low-cost
method for determining property rights as Lueck (2003) has shown. Third,
even if the apartment owner did not account for the costs, there are only





 Fourth, there are technological solutions, such as noise cancellation
earphones or sound prooﬁng the walls, that the two parties might use to
arrive at an optimum resolution of the conﬂict.
The published property rights literature has provided examples of rights
to assets emerging as they become scarcer. On the western frontier of the
USA, Europeans sought ways to contract with American Indians when the
property rights were clear, fought with them when they were not (Anderson
and McChesney 1994), and hammered out their own property rights once
the rights of Indians were effectively extinguished (Anderson and Hill
1975). The ﬁrst illustrates how recognition of existing rights can lead to
reallocation of resources in the face of new demands; the second illustrates
how high transactions costs and low costs of taking can yield the worst type
of rent seeking, war; and the third shows how parties with conﬂicting demands




Environmental assets offer a new frontier where property rights can




  The author thanks a referee for pointing out that, to the extent the apartment is
unique; that is, has location rents, there may be market power for the rights holder. In this
situation, the price of music or quiet may exceed the marginal value implying monopoly




  For a complete discussion of the evolution of property rights on the frontier, see
Anderson and Hill (2004). 
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improve resource use, proﬁts, and social welfare. Air, water, land, and other
natural resources are used by humans to meet a multitude of demands. In
the absence of some property rights to these resources, competing demands
typically lead to conﬂict and overuse. Conﬂict and overuse lead to resource
rents being dissipated rather than maximised. Property rights that are well
deﬁned and enforced restrict access to the commons and give the owner
incentives to husband the asset; that is, maximise its rents. Determining the
rights will not be costless (see Anderson and Hill 1975, 1983, 1990), but if
they can be deﬁned and enforced, bargaining can then occur taking
account of the reciprocal costs. Leaping to a Pigouvian conclusion that
rights cannot be speciﬁed and that bargaining will fail runs the risk of
replacing the tragedy of the commons with the tragedy of rent seeking
inherent in regulation and taxation. Viewing natural resource problems
through the Coasean lens forces us to consider how property rights evolve
and how transaction costs inherent in alternative sets of rights can encourage
or discourage gains from trade.
The essential point here is that the term ‘Externality is a vacuous and
unhelpful term’ (Randall 1993, p. 145). It adds nothing to the analysis and
may even complicate the potential solution by assuming a set of property
rights that does not exist. Transaction costs may increase because assertion
of the externality confuses the original set of rights and distribution of costs.
In essence the externality claim makes it appear that rights exist but are not
enforced or that rights should be redistributed. It might be that reallocating
the rights will ultimately lower transaction costs, but the reallocation itself
is a form of rent seeking, the cost of which must be subtracted from any
transaction cost savings.
To be sure, asserting an externality may be a useful argument for convincing
others such as fellow citizens, courts, or legislatures that a set of property
rights in fact exists. In other words, asserting an externality may help a
person deﬁne and enforce a claim. Pejorative words such as pollution or
environmental damage suggest that the person discharging efﬂuent or alter-
ing the natural world is imposing costs on others. Again, this assumes others
have a right to be free of those costs. Claims of externalities may be based
on historical uses or ethical judgements about right and wrong, but they
are not necessarily lodged in economic efﬁciency. An economist has little to
say about the legitimacy of claims, but he can analyse how transaction
costs determine the initial distribution of rights or how contracting costs
will affect the ﬁnal allocation of resources.
Coase’s important point was that economists have not been careful in their
analyses of environmental issues and have claimed externalities without
considering the structure of property rights and how they evolve. Fortun-
ately, because of Coase’s insights, economists are equipped to consider 
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how different ownership regimes and transaction cost constraints evolve
and how they resolve competing uses. In this era of environmentalism, it is




 2004), but this does not tell us who has what rights. Following Coase’s
lead, we need to carefully examine the institutions that actually determine
resource allocation as he did with lighthouses (Coase 1974). Moreover, if
asserting externalities runs counter to the existing rights, transaction costs
may rise, conﬂict over competing uses may increase, and market solutions




 As Coase recognised, the costs of deﬁning, enforcing
and exchanging property rights are not necessarily low and, as a result,
efﬁcient market exchanges will not always be forthcoming. The obvious
questions at this point are three: why are the transaction costs high; can they
be reduced; and what should be done if the transaction costs cannot be
reduced as a result of nonexclusiveness and nonrivalry? Let us consider these




Land-use regulations offer a quintessential application of externality thinking
to sound, smell, view, trafﬁc, and virtually any other case where one property
owner’s use of resources competes with another’s use. So the argument goes,
when property owner A emits sound waves, produces odours, builds in the path
of light, or drives on roads, he imposes costs on property owner B and does
not compensate B for those costs. The solution to this externality problem
often is to regulate A’s land use so as to prevent A from imposing costs on B.
The Coasean lens, however, produces a very different approach to this
competition for scarce resources. Certainly there are social costs resulting
from competing uses, but the social costs are reciprocal. If property owner
B blocks owner A from creating sound waves, emitting odours, building in
the path of light, or driving on the street, property owner A is now bearing
the reciprocal cost. Through this lens, the focus is not solely on whether a
social cost is created by competition for scarce resources, but rather who
bears this cost based on property rights. To call for a zoning regulation
under the banner of externality is to assert a property right when, indeed,
the conﬂict is the result of unclear property rights in the ﬁrst place.
The question then is how do these conﬂicts over property rights get
resolved. When small numbers of disputants are involved, the resolution
itself may be a form of bargaining where the parties recognise that conﬂict




  For a discussion of these alternatives in the context of Indian-white relations on the
American frontier, see Anderson and McChesney (1994). 
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larger numbers are involved, some adjudication process will be necessary.
This process might take place in common law courts where judges attempt
to discern whether there is precedent for the property rights claims or in
legislatures where interest groups vie for the political power necessary to
get them their rights or prevent their rights from being taken away. Both
may initially involve rent seeking, but at least the common law system relies
on predictability based on precedent whereas the legislature is not so bound
and, hence, is less predictable.
Yandle (1998) examined common law court rulings to illustrate how
property rights are clariﬁed and how the clariﬁcation leads to resolution of









 (4 F. 561, W.D. Ark., 1899). The Carmichaels owned a 45-acre farm
in Texas on the stream that bordered Arkansas. The city of Texarkana, Arkan-
sas, built a sewage system that collected sewage and dumped it ‘immediately
opposite plaintiffs’ homestead, about eight feet from the state line, on the
Arkansas side.’ As a result of the sewage, the Carmichaels were forced to





Believing they were harmed by Texarkana’s actions, the Carmichaels sued
the city seeking damages and injunctive relief. The court found that Texarkana’s
Cesspool is a great nuisance because it fouls, pollutes, corrupts, con-
taminates, and poisons the water of [the creek], depositing the foul
and offensive matter … in the bed of said creek on plaintiffs’ land and
homestead continuously … depriving them of the use and beneﬁts
of said creek running through their land and premises in a pure and
natural state as it was before the creation of said cesspool.
Though the city was operating properly under state law, the judge in the
case found that this was no excuse for fouling the water and thereby vio-
lating the property rights of the Carmichaels. It is worth emphasising that the
Carmichaels prevailed in 1899, long before clean water regulations were






Union Bag and Paper Co.
 
 (208 NY. 1, 101 N. E. 803, 1913)
shows how common law can establish Coasean property rights that can form
the basis for bargaining. In this case, Mr Whalen owned and operated a




US1m to build and that
used the creek to dispose of its waste. Whalen sued the mill seeking damages
and an injunction, contending that its efﬂuent made the water unﬁt for agri-
culture, and he prevailed. An appellate court reversed the injunction based
on the company’s argument that the original court did not take account of the
value of the mill and the 500 jobs it created. New York’s highest court,
however, reinstated the injunction, stating 
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Although the damage to the plaintiff may be slight as compared with
the defendant’s expense of abating the condition, that this is not a
good reason for refusing an injunction. The fact that the appellant has
expended a large sum of money in the construction of its plant, and
that it conducts its business in a careful manner and without malice,
can make no difference in its rights to the stream.
In other words, it was Whalen’s clearly deﬁned property rights that pro-
tected him from invasion and, therefore, required that the company bargain
with Whalen and other riparian owners before competing with their uses of
the stream. In neither of these examples do we need the term externalities;
both are examples of how property rights reallocate reciprocal costs and
allow bargaining once rights are clariﬁed.
Another advantage of property rights clariﬁcation through common law
courts is the process that it sets in place. In the above case it might have been
that the loss to Whalen from the efﬂuent was less than the gain to Union Bag
and Paper Company and its employees from the production that created
the efﬂuent. In ﬁgure 1 that would mean the solution imposed by the court
was not D*. But this is where the Coasian approach has advantages over
the Pigouvian approach. Once the rights were clariﬁed by the New York
Supreme Court, Whalen and the company could engage in bargaining that
would move them toward D* (as seen in ﬁgure  1). This process can be
repeated numerous times as demand and technology change.
A Pigouvian solution starting with the presumption of an externality,
however, has no room for bargaining. To correct the problem, a tax, subsidy,
or regulated output is imposed by a governmental authority with the pre-
sumption that it will achieve D*. Because the marginal valuation is unknown,
so is the location of D*. This not only requires more centralised knowledge
than the Coasian solution; it also requires that the administering authority
has an incentive to aim for D* and that it will be able to revise its imposed
D* in response to changing conditions. Ample examples from the environ-
mental arena suggest that political forces make this presumption unlikely
(see Anderson 2000).
Not only do these examples illustrate the way property rights apply to
the problem of social cost, they also illustrate the evolutionary nature of
property rights. As long as resources such as water for domestic consumption
are not scarce, there is no competition for use, and there is no reason to




When resources become scarce, rents from the scarce resource are up for




  For a discussion of the evolution of property rights, see Anderson and Hill (1975). 
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game may be zero-sum in terms of one party’s gain from establishing owner-
ship becoming the other’s loss, and negative-sum to the extent that both





we can estimate the extent of rent dissipation caused by different dispute
resolutions systems (e.g., war, courts or coin tosses) and use game theory
to predict whether and how a resolution might occur. For example, the
tragedy of the commons is not necessarily the ultimate outcome of non-
exclusiveness because clubs, community organisations, or private association





 Whether the evolution of property rights occurs through common
law courts, voluntary associations, legislatures, or other governmental insti-
tutions, the economist’s job is to compare transaction costs.
Zoning certainly could be considered one of these procedures, especially




 But even there, the potential exists for
redistributing property rights under the guise of externalities. Consider an
example in North Carolina where a new sewage treatment system allows
denser development away from municipalities with centralised sewage
systems (see Stradling 2004). In the absence of the new system, housing
density was limited by proximity of septic tanks to neighbouring property,
especially water wells. As a result of the new technology, one development
went from being allowed to have only one house per ﬁve acres to being
allowed nearly one per acre. Residents in the vicinity of the potentially more
dense developments claimed that development is imposing costs on them in
the form of noise, road congestion, air pollution, and wildlife habitat
destruction. They therefore called for land-use regulations to prevent land-
owners from having such dense developments that reduce their land values.
A Pigouvian externality approach rationalises this restriction by assuming
that the neighbours have a right to be free from the costs being imposed
on them. A Coasean analysis recognises the reciprocal nature of costs,
asks whether there are property rights that would allow bargaining, and
analyses the transaction costs and allocation associated with the status
quo rights.
It is worth considering Fischel’s (2003, p. 362) conclusion regarding










See Anderson and Simmons (1993) for a discussion of voluntary associations that can




For a discussion of zoning and property rights, see Fischel (2003). 
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‘The chief problem with local zoning is that it can work too well for
existing residents. By taking away development rights from owners of
developable land, zoning can disenfranchise would-be members of the
community. Insistence by the courts that existing homeowners respect
others’ right to develop land in ways deemed normal to a larger region





Though water markets are growing around the world (see Anderson and
Snyder 1997), water allocation is often contentious, and that contention
increases with scarcity. In places such as the arid American desert, the main
historical uses for water have been mining or agriculture. Establishing a
property right to water followed a ﬁrst-possession rule: the person who
was ﬁrst to claim water for a beneﬁcial use has a right to that claim, which
supercedes subsequent claims. This ‘ﬁrst in time-ﬁrst in right’ system
required that the person wishing to establish a property right had to use the
water and could not simply claim it for a future, unspeciﬁed use. In this
way, diversion provided a low-cost way of signalling to others that an indi-
vidual had asserted a water claim. As long as water remains to be claimed,
there is no scarcity and, therefore, there are no conﬂicting claims. If and when
water withdrawals exceed ﬂows, prior appropriators can enforce their
claims against latecomers forcing them to reduce their withdrawals until
sufﬁcient water is available to meet senior claims. Obviously, senior claims
are more valuable than junior ones in this system, but if the rights are clear,
exchanges can take place to reallocate water from one diversion use to another.
Deﬁning and enforcing the rights is deﬁnitely not costless. Methods for
recording and measuring water withdrawals are often less than precise.
Many rights were claimed prior to a formal legal system with a courthouse
where records could be ﬁled. As scarcity has increased, however, codiﬁca-
tion of early rights has occurred, even though this codiﬁcation has been
costly. Metering devices can be installed at diversion points, but they are
expensive and will not be installed until water becomes valuable enough to
warrant the metering investment. To complicate matters, return ﬂows are
often claimed again and again by downstream users. This means that water
transfers from one use to another or from one place to another that may
affect return ﬂows have to be taken into account before transactions can be
consummated. If they are not, it is tempting to say that there is an externality;
but it is more precise to recognise that rights are being violated. For this
reason, legal systems in the American West allow return ﬂow claimants a
chance to contest exchanges that they expect will violate their rights. 
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Consider what all of this means for transaction costs. Recording and
measuring water rights reduce the cost of exchange, but doing so requires
investments. These investments are not likely to occur until the value of
water is sufﬁciently high to warrant them. As more and more downstream
claims to return ﬂows arise, even more must be invested in quantifying
diversions and consumption rights. Contested case hearings allow poten-
tially harmed water owners a lower cost way of defending their claims when
exchanges are proposed. All in all, the prior appropriation system of the
American West evolved as if the players were wearing Coase-coloured glasses.
The prior appropriation system, which evolved as a way of allocating
water between alternative diversion uses, mainly agricultural, has come under
pressure from new demands. For instance, as growing urban demands com-
bine with existing demands, additional withdrawals reduce the assimilative
capacity of the stream and reduce water quality, and as recreational
demands increase the value of instream ﬂows, conﬂicts with diverters arise.
How well can increasing scarcity be handled under the prior appropriation
system?
Municipalities certainly have the option of buying water from agri-
cultural water owners subject to claims of other users. Such transfers, however,
have been complicated. It took Los Angeles many years to purchase water
from the Owens Valley. Libecap (unpublished manuscript, 2003) points out
that the bilateral monopoly nature of the exchange made it difﬁcult to
negotiate the distribution of the gains from trade. There is nothing par-
ticularly unique about such negotiating costs and nothing to suggest that
there was water market failure. Another hurdle to the exchange came from
third parties whose businesses were indirectly affected. For example, farm
implement dealers feared that shifting water from agriculture would reduce
the demand for their implements. They claimed an externality, but did they
have a right for which they should be compensated? The economist cannot
answer this question, but he can examine, as Libecap does, the increased
transaction costs that arise if such claims can trump water exchanges.
In the case of water quality, is there an externality? Again the questions
are who has what rights and what are the transaction costs associated with
different rights structures. A city will bear higher treatment costs for potable
water as the assimilative capacity of the stream is reduced by withdrawals.
If the city has a right to a certain water quality, courts are likely to allow it
to halt water transfers that reduce quality or require that it be compensated
for its higher treatment costs, or both. Alternatively, if diverters have prior
rights to withdrawals, efforts by a city to halt those withdrawals will be
imposing costs on the existing rights holders. In this case, if the city wants
cleaner water, it can either treat the water or pay diverters to reduce their
withdrawals, whichever is cheaper. Negotiating with agricultural diverters 
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may be costly, but this is what transaction cost analysis is all about. Again
there is no reason to refer to externalities; the issue is one of property rights
and transaction costs.
Finally, consider the rising recreational value of water for instream ﬂows.
Is the ﬁsher who goes to a stream and ﬁnds it dewatered experiencing
an externality? Does the death of spawning salmon as a result of low ﬂows
constitute an externality? Fishers and salmon lovers might assert so, but the
question is who has what rights. If the diverters with senior prior appropriation
rights have the right to divert, the Coasean solution is for ﬁshers to
purchase water rights and leave them instream. The free-rider problem
might raise its ugly head because of nonexclusiveness or non-rivalry, but
governments are arguably formed to overcome the free-rider problem by
making free riders pay through fees or taxes. Laws that allow downstream
diverters to claim water not diverted make it difﬁcult for ﬁshers to purchase
diversion rights and leave them instream. But this is a matter of the legal
system raising transaction costs. In Montana, for example, the legislature
changed the law so that groups or agencies can lease water for instream
ﬂows after they specify the stream reach over which they propose to assert
their claim (see Anderson and Snyder 1997, pp. 121–122), and over that reach
their water cannot be diverted by others. This lowered transaction costs
and facilitated negotiations. In contrast, if instream ﬂow demanders assert
externalities in a world where water rights for diversion are clear, those with
diversion rights will claim a taking and resist efforts to keep water instream.
This is clearly the problem in the Klamath River Basin in Oregon (see
Meiners and Kosnik 2003). The externality approach raises transaction
costs and encourages negative-sum battles over rights while the Coasean
approach focuses on the possibility for positive-sum exchanges that can be




Wildlife habitat generally and endangered species preservation in particular
offer other examples of how Coase-coloured glasses can better focus our
attention on the potential for bargaining to better meet new demands (see
Anderson 1998). The issue is how are land, water, and air resources allocated
to produce traditional commodities and how might they be reallocated to
produce wildlife habitat. There can be little doubt that people are placing
increasing value on wildlife and endangered species, but how will this
demand be met?
Consider a forest that might be used as timber for lumber or paper pulp,
habitat for wildlife, or some combination of the two. How the land will be
used depends on the production function for the possible goods and the 
Donning Coase-coloured glasses 459
 
© Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004
 
relative prices of the goods. It may be that the physical constraints of the
production function dictate that lumber production precludes wildlife
habitat production, but it may be that the two outputs are complementary in
production. If the value of wildlife habitat to the landowner is zero or neg-
ative, it will never displace lumber production when the two are substitutes.
Even if habitat has no opportunity cost in terms of lumber production,
zero or negative-valued wildlife habitat will only result as a by-product of
lumber production. It will not be produced for its own sake.
Focus on the case of mutual exclusivity in the production of the two outputs.
If the landowner cuts his trees and reduces habitat, is there an externality?
Because of scarcity, there is deﬁnitely a reciprocal cost associated with cut-
ting the timber, but again, the questions are who has what rights and what
transaction costs are associated with exchanging them?
Endangered species policy has generally been pursued under the asser-
tion that wildlife lovers have the right to species survival meaning that
landowners, private or public, must preserve the habitat. At least in the
USA, there is ample evidence to suggest that this assignment of rights is
not easy to enforce. Landowners wanting to alter their land in ways that
reduce habitat have no way of negotiating with citizens who demand habitat.
Moreover, it is virtually impossible to monitor all habitat modiﬁcations,
especially those that take place before land is actually inhabited by a
species. If land-use regulation is more likely with an endangered species
on the property, owners might eliminate habitat prior to actual habitation.
On this point, Lueck and Michael (2003) asked whether the threat of
endangered species regulations encouraged timber owners to harvest earlier
than they otherwise might if they thought there was an increased probab-
ility that an endangered species might move onto their land. Using the
number of red-cockaded woodpecker colonies within a 25-mile radius of
a timber parcel considered for harvest as a proxy for the probability of
habitation by the species, they found that the average age of harvest declined
dramatically as the likelihood of habitation and, with it, regulation increased.
The negotiation costs for habitat alteration have been reduced through
the creation of habitat credits (see Bayon 2002). If one landowner can
produce habitat, he can get credit from the US Fish and Wildlife Service for
having created new habitat and sell that credit to the landowner who wants
to eliminate habitat elsewhere. From then on, the landowner who created the
habitat is required to maintain it. Under this program, the International
Paper company, one of the largest landowners in the region where these
woodpeckers live, now has more colonies than there are on all of the US
Forest Service lands in the region. In the Pigouvian tradition, endangered
species regulations constrain land use. Habitat credits, however, give the
producer of habitat a valuable property right that can be marketed. 
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This type of property right can reduce transaction costs and increase the
incentive for landowners to produce habitat, but it ﬁrst requires a redistri-
bution of rights from the landowner to the polity. The redistribution is often
in the name of reduced transaction costs or equity, or both. Again it should
be emphasised that the rent-seeking costs inherent in such redistribution
must be netted from the beneﬁts of lower transaction costs.
Another example can be found with wolf reintroduction into Yellowstone
National Park. When the federal government began talking about reintroduction,
not surprisingly livestock owners in the vicinity were opposed fearing
that their land would become habitat and their livestock would become
food. To mitigate some of the opposition, Defenders of Wildlife, an en-
vironmental group, raised private money and established a trust fund from
which they agreed to pay for livestock lost to wolves. In a sense, they took
a share of the ownership in wolves and accepted the responsibility for
wolf predation. The system still has its transaction costs associated
with proving whether the livestock loss was caused by wolves and how
much the livestock was worth, but in general Defenders of Wildlife has tried
to keep these costs low. Because this is not truly a property right, however,
there is the question of whether Defenders of Wildlife will continue to pay
compensation as the wolf population expands in number and territory. But
for now Coase-coloured glasses help us understand the efﬁcacy of this approach.
The point is that simply asserting an externality when a landowner reduces
wildlife habitat ignores whether the landowner has the right to reduce the
habitat and ignores the incentives implicit in this assignment of rights. In
many parts of the world, hunters accept that landowners have the right to
alter wildlife habitat and pay them not to. Under this system of property
rights, wildlife habitat becomes an asset for the landowner giving him an
incentive to produce more of it. There are still costs of measuring and mon-
itoring contracts, but they are low enough for the contracts to exist, and
the contracts are becoming more prevalent as the value of wildlife increases




If environmental economics is to be extracted from its externality rut, it
will have to be grounded on a Coasean foundation of property rights and
contracting costs. Accordingly, we should expunge the concept of external-
ity from the published environmental economics literature and replace it
with property rights and transaction costs. The externality focus assumes
away problems by implicitly or explicitly asserting property rights that may
or may not exist and generally assumes that contracting costs prohibit
enforcement and exchange of property rights. 
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This is not to say that property rights always exist, that they will always
evolve, or that if they exist, there is never a case to be made for redeﬁning
those rights. Until resources become scarce, there is little reason for people
to invest in deﬁning and enforcing property rights. Once a resource does
become scarce, competition among potential claimants may make it impos-
sible to deﬁne the rights. And in some cases where property rights do exist,
they may be deemed illegitimate and, therefore, taken away (e.g., slavery),
or their conﬁguration may make transaction costs so high that bargaining
is impossible without redeﬁnition.
That said, Coase-coloured glasses concentrate our attention on bargain-
ing in the marketplace as a solution to conﬂicts over resource use. Such
bargaining switches on entrepreneurship and forces decision makers to
consider alternative margins for conﬂicting resource uses. By building en-
vironmental economics on a transaction-cost foundation that has allowed us
to better understand why we have ﬁrms and how they operate to allocate
scarce resources, we can better understand how to produce environmental
assets. This is the same framework used by managers with respect to capital
and labour markets where property rights are clear and could be more
fruitfully applied to natural resource and environmental markets. By wear-
ing Coasean glasses and focusing on the transaction costs associated with
the use of environmental assets in the same way that we focus on these costs
for other aspects of ﬁrm management, we economists can begin to explore
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